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Abstract: This paper considers the positive and normative aspects of tariffs and advertising taxes 
in a situation in which a foreign monopolist chooses advertising as well as output. On the 
positive side it is shown that under certain circumstances a tariff will induce a fall in the 
domestic consumer price of the import. On the normative side the paper demonstrates that an 
import subsidy can be optimal under two different specifications of the welfare function. 
I I N T R O D U C T I O N 
B rander and Spencer (1984) have shown tha t a t a r i f f employed against a foreign monopolist w i l l raise home welfare provided tha t the marginal 
revenue curve is more steeply sloped t han the inverse demand curve . 1 I n 
t he i r model protect ion only affects the ou tpu t (or price) decision of the 
monopolist. However, i n practice protection can be expected to affect a whole 
range of variables inc luding capacity choice, R & D , product development and 
advertising. The purpose of this paper is to examine the positive and norma­
t ive implications of tariffs i n a si tuation i n which the f i r m is also engaging i n 
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1. K a t r a k (1977) had earlier shown that "a country that obtains supplies of a product from a 
foreign monopolist may find that free trade is not the appropriate policy". I t is argued by de Meza 
(1979) that price controls set just above the monopolist's average cost is the best policy. However, 
price ceilings on imports are not a commonly observed policy. Helpman and K r u g m a n (1989) 
provide an overview of the arguments. 
persuasive advertising. On the positive side an impor tant result of this paper 
is the possibili ty of a Metzler paradox: a t a r i f f w i l l i n some instances lead to a 
fa l l i n the marke t price of a good. On the normative side I show t h a t the 
presence of persuasive advert is ing can strengthen or weaken the case for a 
t a r i f f depending on whether the good is over valued or under valued by 
consumers. 
I n the model t h a t I consider i n th is paper the f i r m opt imal ly chooses i t s 
advert is ing expenditure as we l l as its output (or price). I restr ict at tention to 
adver t i s ing t h a t affects consumer tastes, specifically I assume t h a t an 
increase i n adver t is ing shifts the inverse demand for the good to the r igh t . 
This is usually referred to as "persuasive" advertising, as distinct from adver­
t i s ing tha t serves to inform the consumer. 2 
Assessing the welfare implications of protection i n circumstances i n which 
i t induces changes i n tastes is clearly problematic. Should welfare compari­
sons between household consumption levels before and after protection be 
made at pre-protection tastes, post-protection tastes or at some other tastes? 
Since persuasive adver t i s ing posit ively affects the u t i l i t y function of the 
consumer should i t therefore be modelled as posit ively affecting welfare? 
These issues have been extensively debated. 3 Through most of the paper I 
choose to adopt the D i x i t and Norman (1978) approach to analysing welfare 
change i n the presence of persuasive advertising and endogenous tastes. This 
involves m a k i n g the assumption t h a t the government has a "standard of 
judgement" i n tha t there is a hypothetical level of advertising tha t makes the 
inverse demand function equal to the "true" marg ina l social valuat ion func­
t ion. Where necessary, however, i n order to investigate robustness, I contrast 
the results w i t h those obtained when i t is assumed tha t the t rue marg ina l 
social valuat ion curve always coincides w i t h the inverse demand. This second 
approach involves m a k i n g the assumption tha t welfare is directly increasing 
i n advert is ing. 4 
Following some preliminaries, Section I I of the paper is concerned w i t h the 
case of a foreign monopolist sell ing into the home market . I t is shown tha t 
protection affects imports i n two ways: f i rs t ly , there is the direct effect tha t 
operates th rough the increase i n the marg ina l costs faced by foreigners: 
secondly, there is an indirect effect since protection influences the level of 
advertising and through this sales. The opt imal t a r i f f is calculated under both 
specifications of the welfare function. I n Section I I I I extend the analysis to 
2. F o r a discussion of this in a similar context see Shapiro (1980) and Grossman and Shapiro 
(1984). 
3. See Dixit and Norman (1978, 1979, 1980), Fisher and McGowan (1979) and Shapiro (1980). 
4. See Dixit and Norman (1978, 1979) and Fisher and McGowan (1979) for a debate on this 
issue. 
consider the possibility tha t the foreign monopolist w i l l carry out i ts advertis­
ing i n the home country itself. I examine an opt imal t a r i f f and advertising tax 
combination under these circumstances. F ina l l y Section I V is a short con­
clusion. 
I I F O R E I G N M O N O P O L Y 
Consider a foreign monopolist supplying a good to the domestic market . 
The monopolist advertises th is commodity to domestic consumers. To keep 
the analysis as simple as possible I w i l l assume the existence of an aggregate 
household w i t h a quasi-linear u t i l i t y function: 
U = u(y,m) + n c , (2.1) 
where y represents the i m p o r t s of the monopolised good and n c the 
consumption of a competit ively produced numeraire good which is produced 
i n the home country. I n order to s implify the analysis I w i l l assume t h a t 
u t i l i t y is quadratic i n y and tha t an increase i n advert is ing expenditure m , 
shifts the u t i l i t y function upwards: u(y,m) = y[a(m) - (b/2)y]. Le t p be the 
consumer price of the import . U t i l i t y maximisat ion implies that : 
U y = p = a ( m ) - b y , (2.2) 
where b is a constant. I w i l l assume tha t a'(m) > 0 , 5 which implies tha t the 
inverse demand funct ion is shifted upwards i n a pa ra l l e l manner when 
advert is ing increases. I n addit ion, I w i l l assume t h a t a(m) is s t r ic t ly concave 
i n adver t i s ing so tha t a"(m) < 0. This assumption is needed to ensure an 
in ter ior solution. 
The monopolist faces a constant marginal production cost denoted by c and 
a constant marg ina l cost of advert ising denoted by u. The home government 
imposes a t a r i f f of t . The profi t function of the monopolist is: 
Jt = (p - c - t )y - urn, (2.3) 
for i t s sales to the home market . I f the f i r m sells on more than one marke t 
then i t is assumed t h a t the overall prof i t function is separable and m is i ts 
adver t is ing specifically for the home market . The f i r m chooses output and 
advert is ing to maximise profits. This implies the first-order conditions: 
5. A prime indicates a derivative. 
ity= a ( m ) - 2 b y - c - t = 0, (2.4) 
for opt imal choice of output and: 
nm = y P m - H = 0, (2.5) 
for advert is ing. The second-order conditions are: JCyy = -2b < 0, and 7Cyy7cmm -
%m r tmy = -2bR > 0, where R = a"y + (a') 2/2b < 0. The second par t ia l deriva­
tives Timm = a"y and = Ttym = a' are obtained from (2.4) and (2.5). Equations 
(2.4) and (2.5) give the equ i l ib r ium output and level of advert is ing respec­
t ive ly , i n i m p l i c i t form. The equ i l ib r ium price is obtainable f rom (2.2) and 
(2.4): 
p = {a(m) + c + t}/2, (2.6) 
wh i l e the i m p o r t price is p* = p - t . Prices and the level of impor ts are 
affected i n two ways by a tariff: directly and through induced changes i n m . 
I t u r n now to the comparative statics of the equi l ibr ium. I t would be useful 
to obtain an expression for the supply response of impor ts to the tar i f f . 
Proceed by tota l ly differentiating (2.5) to get: 
dm/dt = - a 'y t /(a 'y m + a"y) < 0, (2.7) 
where y m = a'/2b f rom (2.4), is the pa r t i a l derivative of y w i t h respect to m 
and y t = - l / 2 b represents the impact of a t a r i f f on the level of impor ts at a 
constant level of advert ising. I t is clear from (2.7) t ha t a rise i n the t a r i f f 
reduces adver t i s ing by the foreign monopolist. Now use (2.7) i n the to ta l 
derivative of (2.4) to give: 
dy/dt = -[a"y/R]/2b < 0. (2.8) 
The supply response is larger i n the presence of endogenous advertising than 
i n i ts absence. This is easily seen when (2.8) is rewri t ten as: 
dy/dt = y t [ l - a'dm/dt]. (2.9) 
I t is s t ra ight forward to show tha t the expression i n parentheses is larger 
than un i ty . F rom equation (2.6) i t is possible to obtain: 
dp/dt = p t [ l + a'dm/dt]. (2.10) 
The effect of the t a r i f f at a given level of adver t is ing is represented by 
p t = 1/2, and the t e rm i n parentheses is less than un i ty . Now using (2.5) and 
(2.7) allows (2.10) to be rewr i t t en as: 
dp/dt = p t [ l + a'yJR], (2.11) 
I t is now clear t ha t dp/dt can be negative, t ha t is to say a Metzler paradox is 
possible. The condition for this is: a ' y m + H = a"y + (a0 2/b >0. 
Proposition 1: I n the monopoly case, when advert is ing is endogenous, a t a r i f f 
causes imports to f a l l by more, and the price to rise by less than when the 
level of advert ising is fixed. The consumer price of the impor t w i l l rise i f a"y + 
(a0 2/b < 0. 
The t a r i f f reduces ou tpu t leading to an u p w a r d movement along the 
inverse demand curve bu t i t also induces a fa l l i n advert ising spending which 
shifts this demand curve inwards. As a resul t the quant i ty imported and the 
impor t price p* both fa l l by more than they would i f advert is ing was fixed. 
The terms of trade improvement resul t ing from the t a r i f f is obtained from 
(2.7). I t is: 
dp*/dt = p * t [ l - a 'dm/dt], (2.12) 
where p * t = -1/2 represents the effect of a t a r i f f on the terms of trade w i t h 
advert is ing fixed. 
I now t u r n to the problem of welfare maximisa t ion . Fo l lowing D i x i t and 
Norman (1978) I shall assume tha t there is a reference level of advertising, m 
= A , which could be zero, t ha t sets the inverse demand curve for the impor t 
equal to the government's margina l social valuat ion curve for t ha t good. The 
domestic welfare function is therefore: 
W = U ( y , A , n c ) = u(y,A) + n c , (2.13) 
where u(y,A) =[a - (b/2)y]y, and a s a(A). 
The model can be embedded i n a general equi l ib r ium framework by assuming 
tha t the home country exports the numeraire good i n exchange for the good 
produced by the monopolist. The balanced trade condition is: 
n p - n c = p * y , (2.14) 
where n p i s the production of the numeraire good. Us ing (2.14) i n (2.13) i t is 
possible to wr i te the welfare function i n the fol lowing way: 
W = u(y,A) - py + ty + n p . (2.15) 
The f i r s t two terms on the r i g h t hand side of (2.15) represent the social 
surplus , ne t of tax revenue, t h a t is obtained f rom consumption of the 
imported good. The t h i r d t e rm (ty) is government revenue from the t a r i f f and 
the last t e r m (n p ) is the production of the numeraire good which is assumed to 
be constant. 
Tota l differentiation of the welfare function yields: 
dW = -y [dp - dt] + tdy + [a - a(m)]dy (2.16) 
The f i r s t two terms on the r i g h t hand side of (2.16) represent the fami l i a r 
terms of trade and volume of trade effects. The last t e rm occurs because there 
is i n general a gap between the shadow price of the monopolised good and i ts 
marke t price. This gap, a - a(m), w i l l be negative when the actual level of 
advert is ing exceeds the reference level A. 
The first-order condition for welfare maximisat ion by choice of t is: 
dW/dt = -ydp*/dt + (a + t - a(m))dy/dt = 0. (2.17) 
Us ing (2.12) i n (2.17) i t is possible to obtain an explicit expression for the 
opt imal tariff . 
t° = a(m) - a + by° (2.18) 
Subst i tut ion into th is for y°, the opt imal value of y, yields: 
t° = a(m) - (2cc + c)/3. (2.19) 
This gives the fol lowing result. 
Proposition 2: The opt imal t a r i f f is declining i n a and c. For a sufficiently 
large positive difference between the shadow price u y (y ,A) and the marke t 
price p the opt imal policy is an impor t subsidy. 
I now consider the opt imal i ty of a t a r i f f under an alternative specification 
of the welfare function. One reason for doing this is tha t Fisher and McGowan 
(1979) criticise D i x i t and Norman's approach to modell ing welfare change i n 
the presence of advert is ing and endogenous tastes. They argue tha t " i f the 
amount of adver t i s ing enters the u t i l i t y function the na tu ra l cr i ter ion for 
welfare comparison is the unrestr icted u t i l i t y function so defined". D i x i t and 
Norman compare the u t i l i t y obtained from post-advertising output w i t h the 
u t i l i t y obtained from pre-advertising output at (i) pre-advertising tastes and 
( i i ) post-advert is ing tastes. Fisher and McGowan argue t h a t one should 
compare u t i l i t y at post-advertising output and tastes w i t h the u t i l i t y level at 
pre-advertising output and tastes. 6 When this "non-paternalistic" approach is 
adopted the welfare function is increasing i n advertising. I t is wor th examin­
i n g the difference tha t th is makes to the results: I w i l l replace the welfare 
function given i n (2.13) w i t h the u t i l i t y function of the aggregate household 
given i n (2.1). The government's welfare maximisat ion problem is now: 
Max W = U = [a(m) - (b/2)y]y + n c . (2.20) 
t 
Use of (2.14), the balanced trade condition, i n (2.20) yields: 
M a x W = u(y,m) - py + t y + n p . (2.21) 
t 
Th i s is s imi lar to (2.15) the one difference is tha t the f i r s t two terms on the 
r i g h t hand side now represent actual consumer surplus, which is increasing 
i n advertising. Total ly differentiating this yields: 
dW = u m d m - y(dp - dt) + tdy. (2.22) 
Comparing (2.22) w i t h (2.17) we can see tha t a t e r m i n (a - a(m)) is absent 
f rom (2.21). There is now no divergence between the marke t price of the 
impor ted good and i ts shadow price. However, there is now a new t e r m i n 
u m d m ; welfare is increasing i n advert is ing i n th i s case. The first-order con­
di t ion for the welfare maximis ing choice of the t a r i f f is: 
dW/dt = 0 = y[a 'dm/dt - dp*/dt] + tdy/dt. (2.23) 
F rom (2.22) i t is possible to obtain the fol lowing expression for the opt imal 
tar i f f : 
t° = - y [ l + bdy/dt]/(dy/dt). (2.24) 
The sign of the opt imal t a r i f f clearly depends on the sign of the bracketed 
t e rm i n the numerator. Subst i tut ion of (2.8) in to (2.24) yields: 
t° = b[a"y + (a') 2/b]/a". (2.25) 
I t is clearly possible for this opt imal t a r i f f to be negative. 
6. Le t y 0 be consumption of the imported good in the absence of advertising and y, be the 
consumption level with advertising. Let V 0 ( ) be the utility function at pre-advertising tastes and 
V , ( ) be the utility function at post-advertising tastes. Then Dixit and Norman compare; (i) V 0 (y 0 ) 
with V 0(y,) and (ii) V,(y 0) with V,(y,). While F i sher and McGowan argue that one should compare 
V ^ w i t h V t y , ) . 
Proposition 3: W i t h the non-paternalistic specification of the welfare function 
(i) the opt imal t a r i f f w i l l be positive i f a"y + (a') 2/b < 0 , ( i i) the opt imal t a r i f f 
w i l l be smaller when advert is ing is endogenous than when i t is exogenously 
f ixed . 7 
I t can be seen from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 tha t an impor t subsidy 
may be opt imal under both specifications of the welfare function. However the 
conditions required for an opt imal subsidy are very different. Whereas under 
the D i x i t and N o r m a n specification a negative op t imal t a r i f f cannot occur 
(assuming l inear demands), i f consumers "correctly" value the impor t , i t is 
possible under the al ternative specification where the impor t subsidy causes 
an increase i n advert ising which i n i tse l f raises welfare. 
I l l T H E MONOPOLIST'S A D V E R T I S I N G USES DOMESTIC 
RESOURCES D I R E C T L Y 
So far I have assumed t h a t a l l the foreign monopolist 's adver t is ing is 
conducted outside the home country. I t is wor th considering the difference i t 
makes i f the adver t i s ing direct ly uses domestic resources, t h a t is, i f i t is 
undertaken i n the home country itself. As I w i l l show below, the tariff-only 
results obtained so far continue to ho ld i n th is case when adver t is ing is 
untaxed. However one impor tan t difference is tha t the home government can 
now tax or subsidise th i s adver t i s ing and th is raises some new consider­
ations. 
When foreign adver t is ing uses home resources exclusively the balanced 
trade condition is: 
Le t us suppose t h a t the home country has an endowment of a composite 
factor of production which I w i l l call "labour" e, and tha t the numeraire good 
uses one u n i t of labour to produce one u n i t of output. Since i tm represents the 
t o t a l labour cost of adver t i s ing we get the fo l lowing f u l l employment 
condition: 
n p - n c = p*y - um. (3.1) 
e = n p + um. (3.2) 
Combining (3.1) and (3.2) yields: 
n c = e - p*y. (3.3) 
7. Note that, for the case of a negative optimal tariff, a small increase in the tariff from its 
optimal level will bring about a fall in the market price of the import (from Proposition 1). 
Subst i tu t ion of (3.3) in to (2.13) gives the fo l lowing D i x i t and Norman type 
welfare function: 
W = u ( y , A ) - p y + ty + e, (3.4) 
which is for our purposes essentially the same as (2.15). I f the al ternat ive 
non-paternal is t ic approach is adopted the appropriate welfare funct ion 
becomes: 
W = U = u ( y , m ) - p y + ty + e, (3.5) 
which is i n effect the same as (2.21). Us ing (3.4) and (3.5) i t is possible to 
derive a l l the tariff-only results i n Section I I . So far a l lowing advert is ing to 
use domestic resources has made no difference because the resources are 
valued a t their t rue social cost. However i t is now possible for the government 
to tax th is advertising. 
When the monopolist buys i ts advert ising i n the home country i t may face 
a home advert ising tax. I wish now to consider an opt imal t a r i f f imposed i n a 
si tuation i n which an opt imal advertising tax is also being used. I w i l l adopt a 
welfare funct ion l ike tha t i n (3.4) which mus t now be extended to include 
advert ising tax revenue: 
W = u(y,A) - py + ty + 9m + e, (3.6) 
where 6 is the specific advertising tax. 
The first-order condition for the opt imal choice of the t a r i f f implies: 
dW/dt = (a + t - a(m))(dy/dt) - y(dp*/dt) + 0(dm/dt) = 0. (3.7) 
A comparison of this w i t h (2.17) reveals tha t there is now an addit ional t e rm 
i n 9. When the adver t i s ing tax is positive 0 > 0, an increase i n the t a r i f f 
clearly reduces the revenue from th is source. This works against a positive 
opt imal tariff . 
The first-order condition for the opt imal advertising tax is: 
dW/de = (a + t - a(m))(dy/dO) - y(dp/d9) + m + 9dm/de = 0. (3.8) 
When the t a r i f f is being chosen opt imal ly according to (3.7) i t is possible to 
use tha t equation to el iminate t i n (3.8). When (3.7) is used i n (3.8) several 
terms cancel leaving the fol lowing expression for the opt imal tax on advertis­
ing: 
Proposition 4: When the government is imposing an opt imal t a r i f f on imports 
produced by a foreign monopolist the opt imal advertising tax is positive. 
Note t h a t t h i s resul t is independent of the gap between marke t and 
shadow prices. 
A n explici t expression for the opt imal t a r i f f can now be derived from (3.7) 
and (3.9): 
t° = (a(m) - a) + by°(m) - 2bm[(dm/dt)/(dm/de)]. (3.10) 
The opt imal t a r i f f is once again declining i n a. 
I V C O N C L U D I N G REMARKS 
The purpose of th is paper is to contribute to the analysis of impor t pro­
tection under imperfect competition. I t s focus is on the positive and norma­
t ive aspects of tar i ffs i n a s i tuat ion i n which a foreign monopolist chooses 
adver t i s ing as we l l as output . The most surpr is ing positive f ind ing is the 
possibi l i ty of a Metz ler paradox. Under certain circumstances a t a r i f f can 
b r i n g about a f a l l i n the domestic price of the import . I have also shown tha t 
an impor t subsidy can be an optimal policy under two different specifications 
of the welfare function. 
The monopoly assumption imposed throughout this paper though useful as 
a f i r s t approach is clearly rather simple. I n Leahy (1992) I extend the analy­
sis to consider t a r i f f protection under Cournot oligopoly i n the presence of 
advertising. 
Al though I have concentrated on the issue of persuasive advertising i n this 
paper, i t is possible to extend the analysis to consider product development. I f 
product development means an increase i n the qual i ty of the good, then this 
qual i ty improvement can be modelled as ra is ing the level of consumer u t i l i t y 
and na t iona l welfare d i rec t ly , j u s t as adver t i s ing does under the non-
paternalistic welfare function considered i n this paper. 
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